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NOTES
MATTERS OF DOMESTIC CONCERN:
A POTENTIAL JUDICIAL LIMITATION ON THE TREATY-
MAKING POWER?
With the expansion in the scope of international agreements in re-
cent years has come an increased controversy concerning the extent of
the treaty-making power in the United States. Perhaps the most widely
known debate has been set off by the proposals to limit the treaty power
by Constitutional amendment.' Other arguments have arisen regarding
the extent of the obligations assumed under the United Nations Charter
and by the qualified acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the In-
ternational Court of justice. Many of these discussions have been based
upon political considerations, but the Constitutional argument has also
been widely employed. The contention that there is a constitutional limi-
tation on the treaty-making power of the United States apart from the
requirement of the proper form2 has recently received judicial support
from the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.3
In that case it was held that a Senate reservation providing that no
project for the redevelopment of the United States' share of waters on
the Niagara River, made available for power purposes by the current
treaty with Canada, could be undertaken until specifically authorized by
an act of Congress, concerned a purely domestic matter and was not a
part of the treaty. Thus, it was ineffective as an amendment to the prior
act of Congress which had given control over the development of water
1. Widely publicized have been the proposed Bricker amendments, the most recent
of which would limit treaties by the provisions of the Constitution and deny them legis-
lative effect without Congressional action, unless the Senate affirmatively provides to
the contrary. See Oliver, Treaties, the Senate, and the Constitution: Some Current
Problems (ed. comment), 51 Azi. 3. INT'L L. 606 (1957). For an article supporting the
adoption of the Bricker amendment, see Finch, The Need to Restrain the Treaty-Making
Power of the United States within Constitutional Limits, 48 Am. 3. INT'L L. 57 (1954).
For a contrary argument, see Sutherland, Restricting the Treaty-Making Power, 65
HAP L. REv. 1305 (1952). Similar proposals have been made by the American Bar As-
sociation, state legislatures, and several congressmen. See Ibid. The House of Repre-
sentatives has also proposed an amendment providing for the ratification of treaties by
and with the advice of both houses of Congress. See Kefauver, The House of Repre-
sentatives Should Participate in Treaty Making, 19 TENN. L. REv. 44 (1945).
2. "He (the President) shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S.
CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
3. Power Authority of New York v. Federal Power Commission, 247 F.2d 538(D.C. Cir.), vacated as vtwot, 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
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power on streams over which Congress had authority to the Federal
Power Commission. The reservation was considered as only "an expres-
sion of the Senate's desires."4  The court posed the problem whether
matters of domestic concern could be constitutionally dealt with by
treaty, but did not rest its decision upon this ground. It intimated, how-
ever, that if a treaty were entered into about a purely domestic matter, it
would not be binding upon the courts as the supreme law of the land
because it would be an unconstitutional exercise of that power.'
Judge Bastian, dissenting, vigorously attacked the majority's con-
tention that the reservation could be disregarded and the rest of the treaty
enforced:
If the Senate conditioned its advice and consent to the treaty
upon inclusion of the language in question and upon its being
given an operative effect-if the Senate did so condition its
consent-if the condition was a sine qua non to its consent and
to ratification-if but for its condition being given effect the
Senate would not have consented to the treaty-then regardless
of what the language in question is called it must be given
effect.'
He concluded that if the reservation were invalid as a purely domestic
matter, the court would have to declare the treaty as a whole void.7 This
reasoning seems more cogent, especially since the reservation was not
clearly severable from the remainder of the treaty.
However, Judge Bastian did not take issue with the dictum in the
majority opinion that the treaty-making power may constitutionally be
used only to control matters essentially affecting international affairs,
and that the courts would enforce this mandate. He based his dissent on
the belief that, viewed in context, the content of the reservation was suf-
ficiently related to the traditionally sanctioned subject-matter of the
treaty to be valid if inspired by considerations of international policies.
He seems to envision a "scope" of the treaty-making power in which all
provisions of a valid treaty are the supreme law of the land, even though
if viewed in isolation some are addressed to matters of purely domestic
concern.
8
4. Id. at 543.
5. Ibid.
6. Id. at 546.
7. Judge Bastian gently chides the court for their reluctance to hand down the
first decision invalidating a treaty of the United States. Id. at 548.
8. Ibid.
NOTES
The questions presented, then, are the soundness of the view that
the validity of a treaty may depend upon its subject, and the possible de-
velopment of this position as a judicially enforced limitation on the treaty-
making power. The idea that there is a judicial restraint upon the subject-
matter of treaties has never before been seriously considered in United
States courts. It may have been germinated as a reaction to current
"one world" ideas and the increasing proposals for international agree-
ments on subjects which historically have been considered outside the
scope of international concern. Or perhaps it is an ancient conviction,
the expression of which has only recently become necessary as the treaty-
power has been expanded to new limits and a Constitutional check upon
it has not been forthcoming from the courts.
In order to place this discussion in its proper context, it is necessary
briefly to review the domestic effect of an admittedly valid treaty as
provided in the Constitution, and developed over the years by judicial de-
cisions. The Constitution provides that treaties made under the authority
of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land.' Thus, if a
treaty is self executing, its terms will be enforced in the national courts
without enabling legislation of any kind.1" In addition, the states are
expressly forbidden to enter any treaty, alliance, or confederation, or to
enter an agreement or compact with another state or foreign power with-
out the consent of Congress.'1 The whole treaty-making power, then,
rests in the national government. If the national government cannot
negotiate a particular type of treaty, the United States as a whole may
not do so.
It is well settled that if a valid treaty conflicts with an act of Con-
gress, the later in time will prevail." The effect of this doctrine is lim-
ited to some extent by the reluctance of courts to find a conflict between
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
10. The House of Representatives has always asserted its prerogative not to ap-
propriate the necessary money, if an appropriation is needed to put the treaty into ef-
fect. But it seems that there is at least a moral obligation to do so, and the House has
never refused. See CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
418 (1953) ; Tucker, The Treaty-Making Power Under the Constitution of the Confed-
crate States of America, 1 VA. L. REv. 596 (1914); Wright, Treaties and the Separa-
tion of Powers, 12 Am. J. INT'L L. 64 (1918).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. However, local state laws may have an inci-
dental or indirect effect in foreign countries without being invalid. Thus in Clark v.
Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), a California statute forbidding aliens to inherit property
unless United States' citizens could so inherit in the country of the alien was held con-
stitutional, not being a regulation of foreign affairs.
12. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933) ; The Cherokee Tobacco Case
78 U.S. (liWall.) 616 (1870) ; Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (dicta) ; John
T. Bill Co. v. United States, 27 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 26, 104 F.2d 67 (1939) (dicta);
30 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 351 (1915); CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 420 (1953).
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a treaty and an act of Congress. The courts do not favor repeal by im-
plication, and will not apply the last-in-time doctrine unless there is a
clear conflict.'"
If a valid treaty conflicts with a state statute, whether prior or sub-
sequent, the treaty prevails. The Constitution expressly provides that acts
of Congress and treaties are supreme over the acts of state legislatures."
Judicially, this was settled by the Supreme Court in 1796, and has never
been questioned.'5 However, the courts may also construe the treaties
to prevent incongruity and to narrow their scope.'"
For a time there was a wide difference of opinion as to whether
Congress could pass legislation to give effect to the provisions of a valid
treaty under the "necessary and proper" clause if the legislation would
invade areas otherwise reserved to the states by the tenth amendment.
There were dicta in early cases to the effect that federal jurisdiction
could not be enlarged by the treaty power,'" and many scholars and
statesmen entered the argument.' The controversy was finally settled
in 1920, in the famous case of Missouri v. Holland.9 Mr. Justice Holmes,
delivering the opinion of the court, said that Congress may legislate in
an area normally reserved to the states when exercising that power to
effectuate a valid treaty which related to a national interest of great
magnitude." Thus, the power to implement the provisions of a valid
treaty by domestic legislation has been delegated to the United States.2 '
13. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) ; United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S.
213 (1901) ; Frost v. Wenie, 157 U.S. 46 (1895) ; Chew Heong v. United States, 112
U.S. 536 (1884).
14. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
15. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199 (1796). See also Asakura v. Seattle,
265 U.S. 332 (1924).
16. See Todak v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449 (1930) (treaty intended to pre-
vent discrimination against aliens, not to give aliens rights which citizens do not have) ;
Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 (1921) (treaty with Great Britain does not operate to
supersede a state law in favor of a citizen of Canada in the absence of Canadian ad-
herence to the treaty) ; Prevost v. Greenaux 60 U.S. (19 How.) 1 (1857) (treaty does
not supersede state laws when treaty by its terms is subject to state laws) ; In Re Han-
sen's Estate, 281 N.Y.S. 617, 155 Misc. 712 (Surr. Ct. 1935) (local procedure to en-
force rights given by the treaty must be followed).
17. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); New Orleans v. United
States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836).
18. See, e.g., CRANDALL, TREATIES 247 (2d ed. 1916) ; Leake, The Limitations Upon
the Treaty-Making Power, 1 VA. L. REG. (n.s.) 503 (1915) (criticizing this position
taken by Henry St. George Tucker); Root, Address to First Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law, 1 Am. J. INeT'L L. 273, 279 (1907).
19. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
20. See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). "To the extent that the United
States can validly make treaties, the people and the states have delegated their power to
the National Government and the Tenth Amendment is no barrier." Id. at 18 (separate
opinion by Black, J., Warren, Ch. J., and Douglas and Brennan, J.).
21. The Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany recently reached a con-
trary conclusion. It held that a treaty did not give the federal government power, in
NOTES
The net result of these developments is that a valid treaty can abro-
gate prior acts of Congress, acts of state legislatures whether prior or
subsequent, and can enable Congress to legislate in areas normally re-
served to the states if "necessary and proper" to effectuate the provisions
of a treaty.12 No treaty, and no provision of a treaty, has ever been de-
clared unconstitutional. 2 As the treaty-making power has expanded to-
ward its outer-most limits, each proposed check has been found to be
illusory. Yet few have contended that the treaty-making power is un-
limited.
Two widely held views today propose a limitation upon the subject
matter of a treaty. The first of these convictions is that the treaty-
making power is limited by the provisions of the Constitution. It can-
not go so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids. Having
granted the power, the Constitution defines and limits it. 4 Secondly, it
is contended that the treaty-making power cannot be used to affect a
purely domestic matter, and that the courts should intervene and declare
such agreements void. Advocates of these positions can concede the
"formal" validity of a particular treaty and direct their attack against
its "essential" validity." This approach brings into focus the widely de-
bated conflict between the constitutional obligations of national courts
and international law.
Theoretically, international law is supreme over national law, just as
in the United States, federal law, within its area of operation, is superior
to the laws of the states. 6 After the signatory states have become bound
implementing a treaty, over subjects otherwise belonging to the states. The states could
be made to conform only upon an affirmative showing of a violation of the principle of
"federal fidelity." Das Konkordatsurteil Sonderdruck des urteils vor 26 Mfrz, 1957,
35 CAN. B. REv. 842.
22. See CoRwIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION (1944). "The
concept of Dual Federalism . . . is of no importance whatever in the sphere of inter-
national relations-in this sphere the government of the United States is a government
of centralized, plenary power, in the exercise whereof it is in no respect limited by the
coexistence of the States or by their acknowledged powers. Likewise, the principle of
the Separation of Powers has been read out of the Constitution as a factor capable of
embarrassing the conduct of foreign relations of the United States. . . ." Id. at 29.
23. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 428 (1953).
24. See Anderson, Extent and Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power, 1 Am. J.
INT'L L. 632 (1907) ; Mikell, The Extent of the Treaty-Making Power of the President
and the Senate of the United States, 57 U. PA. L. REv. 435 (1909).
25. These terms have been used by G. G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteut, in the
proposed Code on the Law of Treaties being prepared by the International Law Com-
mission. Formal validity refers to the manner of framing and adopting the treaty,
while essential validity refers to the substance of treaties, the capacity of the parties,
the effect of fraud, error, and duress, and the legality of the object. In addition, tem-
poral validity is concerned with duration, termination, revision, and modification of
treaties. U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/107 (1957).
26. See Potter, Relative Authority of International Law and National Law it the
United States, 19 Aa!. J. INT'L L. 315 (1925).
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to the treaty according to their own internal procedures,27 their
obligatiofn continues until terminated according to principles of inter-
national law. Thus, although United States courts will declare that a
later inconsistent act of Congress terminates the domestic effect of a
prior treaty, the international obligation of the treaty is not abrogated
and will be enforced before an international body.2" On the other hand,
national judges are sworn to uphold the national constitutions and laws,
and will apply existing national, rather than international, law to the
cases before them. A conflict: has arisen in respect to the temporal
validity of treaties and one is threatening in the case of essential validity.
The question then becomes, should national courts, using national
law, attempt to control the-essential validity of treaties as they now con-
trol formal validity, a cotit'se sanctioned by international law, and to a
certain extent temporal validity, a course not sanctioned by international
law? In order to answer this question legal precedents in the United
States must be examined along with the position of international law.
Practical as well as theoretical difficulties must be noted. Especially
relevant are the derivation and legal significance of the terms "domestic
jurisdiction" or "domestic concern" and "proper subject of international
concern," which appears to be the dichotomy to be set up in national
judicial determination of the essential validity of treaties."
The concept of "domestic jurisdiction" has received its impetus
from use in twentieth century multi-party treaties setting up world organ-
izations, which potentially can compel the obedience of the member states.
It has been used as a defensive measure to avoid subjection to these
organizations, and seems to have become a substitute for "the somewhat
battered idols of sovereignty, state equality, and the like.""0 It has been
used by the United States in reservations to compulsory arbitration
treaties; it was included in the Covenant of the League of Nations; and
it presently limits the authority of the United Nations, and the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by reservation
27. The proposed Code on the Law of Treaties provides that the treaty-making
power is the act of the executive authority of the state, but each state can determine for
itself the constitutional processes necessary, to place the executive auhority in a posi-
tioi to exercise this power. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/101 (1956).
28. See Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) ; Wright, Treaties as Law in Na-
tional Courts with Especial Reference to the United States, 32 IND. L.J. 1 (1956); but
see Mikell, The Extent of the Treaty-Making Power of the President and the Senate of
the United States, 57 U. PA. L. Rxv. 435 (1909).
29. Compare Power Authority of New York v. Federal Power Commission, 247
F.2d 538, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1957) with Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
30. Brierly, Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction, 6 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 8 (1925).
NOTES
in the articles of adhesion."' Thus of necessity, the term "domestic
jurisdiction" is relevant in dealing with these organizations.
The limitation in the United Nations Charter is found in Article II,
paragraph 7:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require
members to submit such matters to setilement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 2
The pertinent questions thus become: What are matters essentially with-
in the domestic jurisdiction of a state, and who says what these matters
are?
It is difficult to define the limits of domestic jurisdiction as used in
Article II. Some commentators contend that if treaties are made about
a particular subject, ipso facto, it is no longer an essentially domestic
matter. Thus, ". . the question is not the nature of a disputed matter
but whether customary or contractual international law has left the mat-
ter solely within domestic jurisdiction, or has subjected states to inter-
national obligations in the matter."33  A contrary argument may be
framed from the fact that the United States Senate in approving the
Lodge amendments to the Treaty of Versailles reserved the domestic
jurisdiction of the United States, and listed seven examples, upon all of
which subjects treaties had been concluded.34
A statement that every matter that has been dealt with by treaty is
now a matter without the essentially domestic jurisdiction of a state would
be too broad for defining the meaning of Article II, paragraph 7. Such
31. See Goodrich, The United Nations and Domnestic Jurisdiction, 3 INT'L ORG. 14
(1949).
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. In the Covenant of the League of Nations, mat-
ters which by international law were solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a party
were excepted, and the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Charter included these same
provisions. The exclusion of the former provision and the substitution of "essentially"
for "solely" apparently were not made to effect a change in interpretation from the
Covenant. See Gross, Impact of the United Nations Upon Domestic Jurisdiction, 18
DEP'T STATE BULL. 259 (1948). John Foster Dulles has said that "by international law"
was deleted because of its constantly changing content, which caused it to escape defini-
tion. See Jones, Domestic Jurisdiction--From the Covenant to the Charter, 46 ILL. L.
REv. 219, 240 (1951).
33. Kelson, Limitations on the Functions of the United Nations, 55 YALE LJ. 997,
999 (1946).
34. These were immigration, labor, coastwise traffic, commerce, the suppression of
the traffic in women and children, and in opium and other dangerous drugs. See
Pruess, The International Court of Justice, the Senate, and Matters of Domestic Jurisdic-
tion, 40 A~i. J. INT'L L. 720, 723 (1946).
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matters as the admission of aliens and tariffs traditionally have been
classified as domestic in the context of world organization, although they
have been the subject of treaty. The true minimum test seems to be what
has been considered "domestic" in world organizations, not in voluntary
international agreements. The difficulty lies in choosing a criterion.
Resort may be had to the League of Nations, but activities under the
Covenant must not set the ultimate limits on the sphere of world organi-
zation. The United Nations' expansion should not be limited by past
experiences. New problems should be dealt with on an ad hoc basis.
And, as Lauterpacht has said, ". . . a matter is no longer essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state if it has become a matter of
international concern to the extent of becoming an actual or potential
danger to the peace of the world." 5
Since the area of domestic jurisdiction shrinks as international rela-
tions become more complex and international cooperation more neces-
sary, there is naturally much uncertainty as to its scope at any given time.
Thus, the organ whose function it is to settle disputes as to this matter
can to some degree expand or contract the content of domestic jurisdic-
tion. Yet the Charter itself does not designate any body to decide what
is "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" under Article
II, paragraph 7.
The United Nations has refused to refer this question to the Inter-
national Court of Justice. 6 Being used as a substitute for "sovereignty,"
it may not be a legal term, but a political one which involves questions of
policy more than law. The Court would have to keep the term flexible
to permit new matters to be settled by international agreement as the scope
of international law broadened. Also, the International Court of Justice
could only render advisory opinions on this matter, because many states,
in accepting its compulsory jurisdiction, excepted matters of domestic
jurisdiction as determined by those members from the purview of their
adherence." Thus, if a state argued that a particular matter was do-
mestic under Article II, paragraph 7 of the Charter, it would make the
same contention in the International Court of Justice and not be bound
by the court's decision.
35. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 177 (1950).
36. See Goodrich, The United Nation, and Domestic Jurisdiction, 3 INT'L ORG. 14
(1949) ; Jones, Domestic Jurisdictim-From the Covenant to the Charter, 46 ILL. L. REV.
219 (1951).
37. See 1 U.N. TREATY SERIES 9, regis. No. 3 (1946).
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Some have contended that each state should determine for itself
what it considers matters essentially within its domestic jurisdiction."8
This interpretation would greatly weaken the power of the United Na-
tions, and strengthen the idea that each member state is completely
sovereign. It has not been accepted in the United Nations.
In practice, the respective organs of the United Nations have them-
selves decided disputed questions of interpretation of the Charter, includ-
ing whether a problem coming before them is a matter essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of a state. Thus, the Security Council rejected
the contention that changes in the government of Czechoslovakia al-
legedly brought about by Soviet influence were essentially domestic, and
asserted jurisdiction. The United States' representative joined in stat-
ing that it was for the Security Council, not Czechoslovakia or any other
member, to determine whether the matter was essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of Czechoslovakia.39 This position is supported by
the general principle of international law that "a body possessing juris-
dictional powers has the right in the first place itself to determine the
extent of its jurisdiction."4
Thus, "domestic jurisdiction" as used in Article II, paragraph 7, is
ambiguous at best. Its content changes as more matters are dealt with
internationally, and it has no precise legal definition. It is noteworthy
that even in the United Nations, where domestic jurisdiction is a term
which appears in its Charter, the task of defining its meaning has not
been delegated to a judicial organ. This suggests the inherent weakness
of "domestic jurisdiction" or "domestic concern" as a standard in a
court of law.
In accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice, the United States Senate by the Connally amendment ex-
cepted "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by
the United States of America."'" Thus the United States can withdraw
any matter which it considers essentially domestic. The interpretation
of this phrase presents the same problems as its counterpart in Article II,
38. See Moskowitz, Is the United Nations Bill of Human Rights Dangerous?, 35
A.B.A.J. 283, 288 (1949) (Reply by Frank E. Holman, past president of Am. Bar.
Assn.) ; Gross, The Charter of the United Nations and the Lodge Reservations, 41 Amr.
J. INT'L L. 531 (1947).
39. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc., 3rd year, 56th meeting 32 (1948).
40. See Jones, Domestic Jurisdiction-From the Covenant to the Charter, 46 ILL.
L. REv. 219, 268 (1951). See also Kelsen, Limitations on the Functions of the United
Nations, 55 YALE L.J. 997, 998 (1946) (power to determine when a disputed matter is
solely within domestic jurisdiction implies the power to settle the dispute). This has
been labelled "revolutionary thesis" by Frank E. Holman. See note 38 supra.
41. 1 U.N. TREATY SERiES 9, regis. No. 3 (1946).
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paragraph 7. It was suggested in Senate debate on the amendment that
the United States courts would decide what matters are essentially do-
mestic under the power to interpret treaties." This view is open to at
least two objections. In the first place, domestic jurisdiction may not
be a legal term, but rather one based upon political expediency and
policy. Secondly, since the United States courts do not render advisory
opinions, it is difficult to see how a case or controversy would arise to
present this particular question to the courts. Since only states can be
parties before the International Court of Justice," any dispute as to the
extent of its compulsory jurisdiction would involve independent states.
The United States courts would not enter the argument. It seems that
this decision will have to come from a political organ of our government.
Viewed in the context of international organization the concept of
domestic jurisdiction has been employed as a substitute for sovereignty
to limit their coercive authority. There is no indication that it is meant
as a check upon voluntary agreements among nations, or even that it is a
legally significant term. The position of a single country as to its mean-
ing may shift as it joins in asserting the authority of the United Nations,
or defends against intervention in its own affairs. Moreover, the con-
tent gven to domestic jurisdiction seems to reflect one's opinion about
the relative merits of effective international organization, and complete
national sovereignty.44
The term which seems destined to constitute the other side of the
dichotomy in a national judicial determination of the essential validity of
treaties, all proper subjects of international concern, has a rather vener-
able background. Statements to the effect that a treaty, to be valid,
must cover a subject of genuine international concern have appeared in
judicial opinions through out the history of the United States. How-
ever, the point has never been seriously argued and has been used merely
to emphasize the extent of the treaty-making power, i.e., that the treaty
in question meets this requirement.45 Since domestic concern and proper
subject of international concern are actually different sides of the same
42. 92 CONG. REC. 10697 (1943).
43. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 34, para. 1.
44. Cf. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 56 (1944) (when
total war is the price of total sovereignty, the price is too high).
45. See, e.g., Santovincenzo v. Eagan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (treaty power broad
enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign relations) ; Asakura v.
Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (treaty power extends to all proper subjects of nego-
tiation between our country and other nations) ; In Re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891) ;
Geoffrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890) ; United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of
Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 197 (1876) (treaty power ample to cover all the usual subjects
of diplomacy); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 242 (1872) (treaty power ex-
tends to all objects usually regarded as the proper subject of negotiation and treaty).
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coin, their utility as standards to test the essential validity of treaties
may be examined together.
The immediate problem is one of content. The same problems of
vagueness and uncertainty as to meaning at any particular time are pres-
ent as is the case with Article II, paragraph 7 of the United Nations
Charter. What is a matter of purely domestic concern? Or conversely,
what are matters of international concern? The Constitution does not
state over which subjects the treaty power may operate. The treaty
power was initially considered a commercial power, and matters not
directly or indirectly concerned with commerce were considered not
proper subjects for treaties.4" However, it is not contended that the
subjects which constitutionally can be dealt with by treaty have been
frozen by past agreements. If this were the case, international coopera-
tion would be unable to develop beyond the most primitive forms.
The test cannot be based solely upon what has been considered do-
mestic jurisdiction by the United States in dealing with world organiza-
tions. As has been pointed out, the admission of aliens and tariffs have
traditionally been considered domestic in this context. But the United
States has entered numerous treaties concerning these subjects." Treaties
have also been entered into by the United States permitting aliens to hold
and inherit property in the United States,"8 providing for the equal pro-
tection of aliens,49 providing for the punishment of United States citizens
abroad by Consular courts, 0 and for the protection of migratory birds.5
It could be contended that some of these subjects would fall within the
realm of "domestic jurisdiction" in a world organization.
What is a proper subject of international concern in dealing with
voluntary treaties seems to depend upon the development of international
law. Just as the limits of "domestic jurisdiction" in world organizations
are set by what has been done and what is being done in these bodies,
the limits of domestic jurisdiction relative to treaties are defined by
46. See Bruce, Federal Treaties and the State Police Power, 54 Amt. L. REG. 699(1906).
47. See, e.g., Treaty With China on Immigration, July 28, 1868, 16 STAT. 739, T.S.
No. 48; Treaty With Sweden and Norway on Naturalization, May 26, 1869, 17 STAT.
809, T.S. No. 350; Treaty With Uruguay on Naturalization, Aug. 10, 1908, 36 STAT.
2165, T.S. No. 527.
48. E.g., Treaty With Sweden and Norway on Commerce and Friendship, Sept. 4,
1816, 8 STAT. 232, T.S. No. 347; Treaty With Persia on Commerce and Friendship, Dec.
13, 1856, 11 STAT. 709, T.S. No. 273.
49. E.g., Treaty With Japan on Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1911, 37 STAT.
1504, T.S. No. 558.
50. E.g., Treaty With Japan on Commerce and Consuls, June 17, 1857, 11 STAT.
723, T.S. No. 184.
51. Treaty With Great Britain on Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, 39 STAT. 1702,
T.S. No. 628.
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what nations are doing by voluntary agreement. The fact that nations
are making treaties about the subject, seems to rebut the argument that
it is solely a matter of domestic concern. Ipso facto, that particular sub-
ject becomes a matter of international concern. This reasoning was
used by United States courts as early as 1840, although in more re-
strictive language:
The power to make treaties is given by the Constitution in
general terms; without any description of the objects intended
to be embraced by it; and consequently it was designed to in-
clude all those subjects which, in the ordinary intercourse of
nations, had usually been made subjects of negotiations and
treaty, and which are consistent with the nature of our insti-
tutions and the distribution of powers between the general and
state governments. 52
However, use of the practice of nations to ascertain the meaning of
proper subject of international concern is not without difficulties. Its
constantly changing content causes it to escape definition. What is solely
domestic today might be of international concern tomorrow. Moreover,
as new areas become the subject of treaty, there will be no international
precedent to consider. The courts could decide each case on an ad hoc
basis without laying down general principles or definitions. However
the propriety of entering into a treaty on a particular subject is largely
a practical one determined by political expediency and the prevailing public
demand for such a treaty. Are the courts proper bodies for determining
these forces and attitudes ?
The concept of sovereignty places another obstacle in the path of a
national judicial determination of the essential validity of treaties in
terms of the proper subject of international concern-purely domestic
concern dichotomy. The term domestic jurisdiction as used in world
organizations is a stalwart of national sovereignty, but its effect in limit-
ing voluntary international agreements detracts from this principle. If
other nations are making treaties about a particular subject and the
United States is unable to do so because its courts consider the subject a
domestic matter, the United States' sovereignty would not be as extensive
as that of other nations.53 The power to make international agreements
is one of the attributes of sovereignty, and if this power is so limited,
52. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840) (Taney). See also
Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17Wall.) 211 (1872) ; United States v. Reese, 27 Fed. Cas.
742, No. 16,137 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1879).
53. Secretary of State Cushing called this a "political impossibility." 8 Ops.
ATY'y GEN. 411, 415 (1857).
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sovereignty itself must be imperfect. This idea has also received notice
in the Supreme Court:
As a government, the United States is invested with all the at-
tributes of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it
has the powers of nationality, especially those which concern its
relations and intercourse with other countries. We should
hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing such powers."
Corwin says that there is no apparent limitation in the choice of matters
concerning which the United States may treat with other governments."
A third difficulty in a national judicial determination of essential
validity in terms of "domestic concern" stems from the position of the
United States as a member of the community of nations. It has been
argued that the treaty-making power arises from international law and
a priori is plenary and unlimited in terms of subject matter. An attempt
by a state to cut down the scope of this power by constitutional limita-
tions would not be honored by international law." In practice, a refusal
to enter a particular treaty is not more definite if based on constitutional,
rather than policy reasons. The net result is the same. But if the treaty
is entered into and later challenged on constitutional grounds, or if there
is a previous commitment to enter into the treaty, the distinction becomes
vital. If the choice of the subject matter of a treaty is merely one of
policy and expediency, the political organs of government are the final
authority; but if a constitutional check is recognized, the Constitution as
interpreted by the courts is the last word. In the latter situations, in-
ability to enter the treaty because of national constitutional limitations
would not be recognized before an international tribunal, nor would con-
stitutional incapacity be a valid ground for terminating a treaty. 7
It has been pointed out that use of the terms domestic concern and
international concern as legal standards to test the essential validity of
treaties is laden with difficulties. Even if the problems with interna-
tional law were overlooked, or justified on a national self-determination
basis, those concerning the content of these terms would still be present.
What, then, are the alternatives to a constitutional test based on domes-
tic matter or proper subject of international concern?
54. Machenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915). See also People v. Gerke, 5
Cal. 381, 383 (1855) (power of treaty given without restraining it to particular objects
in as plenipotentiary a form as held by any sovereign in any other society).
55. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmERIcA 318 (1953).
56. Potter, Inhibitions Upon the Treaty-Making Power of the United States, 28
Am. J. INT'L L. 456, 472 (1934).
57. U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/107 (1957).
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The most obvious solution would be to declare that what are proper
subjects of negotiation and treaty is a political question. This course
would not necessitate an overruling of precedent. For, although the
courts have stated that certain subjects meet the international concern
test,"8 there has never been a direct holding that it is for the courts ulti-
mately to decide whether a matter is proper for international agreement.
In fact, although the courts have asserted the power to review the formal
validity of treaties, 9 no court has ever declared a treaty void on this
ground."0
The political question position is also supported by the long-standing
precept that the courts will not embarrass the government in the conduct
of foreign affairs. This ideal has been carried out with rather remark-
able consistency. Specifically, courts have not questioned the wisdom of
terminating a treaty," the reasons behind the treaty,"2 whether a state of
war exists, or what governments should be recognized as sovereign."
Even when a court has declared a treaty superseded by a subsequent act
of Congress, it was following the political organs' judgment. A recent
Supreme Court declaration of this attitude of nonintervention is found
in Chicago & Southern Air Lines Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,"
in which the court said, through Mr. Justice Jackson:
But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature
of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judi-
cial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to
the political departments of the government, Executive and
Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only
by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
58. See, e.g., Santovincenzo v. Eagan, 204 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (disposition of prop-
erty of aliens who die in the United States within the scope of the treaty power);
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (treaties for the protection of citizens of
one country residing in the territory of another numerous) ; Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416 (1920) ; Geoffrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 316 (1890) (manner in which alien
can inherit land proper subject of treaty).
59. See Jones v. Walker, 13 Fed. Cas. 1059, No. 7507 (C.C. Va.) (district and
date not given).
60. Perhaps a counterpart to the "enrolled bill rule," which is used by some courts
to avoid looking behind the enrolled bill to determine if statutes were properly passed,
is probable in a judicial determination of formal validity.
61. See CoRwIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmmucA 426
(1953).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 201 (1926); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 312 (1901).
63. See Magnusson, Our Membership in the United Nation's and the Federal Treaty
Power Under the Constitution, 34 VA. L. REv. 137 (1948).
64. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
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advance, or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which
the judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility
and which has long been held to belong in the domain of politi-
cal power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.65
Similarly, John Locke long ago said that the treaty power "must neces-
sarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those in whose hands it is
to be managed for the public good."6  A declaration that a treaty en-
tered into by the United States is unconstitutional because it concerns
purely domestic matters would violate this long standing precept.
It should be noted that a judicial hands-off policy in regard to the
subject matter of treaties does not mean that every type of international
agreement should be entered into. There is a distinction between politi-
cal expediency and constitutional power. The former is more flexible,
and must of necessity reflect the demands of public opinion. If political
expediency and public opinion should so dictate, the treaty-making power
of the United States is constitutionally broad enough to embrace treaties
on any subject.
Another course would be to resort to international law to test and
enforce essential validity. Since treaties are primarily creatures of inter-
national law, principles regarding their essential validity should come
from international, rather than from national law. The International
Law Commission has been engaged in codifying the Law of Treaties for
several years. 7 When this proposed code is completed, it will help to
make the sometimes obscure standards of international law more concrete.
The most obvious requirements of international law in respect to
essential validity are that the treaty be free from fraud, mistake and
duress."6 There may still be some question in the case of duress, espe-
cially when a vanquished nation is in effect compelled to sign an un-
favorable treaty of peace.6" There is also a lack of agreement as to
whether a treaty tainted with fraud, mistake or duress is void or merely
voidable."'
65. Id. at 111.
66. LOCKE, WoRxs 425 (1801 ed.).
67. At first a Convention on the Law of Treaties was begun. U.N. Doc. No.
A/CN.4/23 (1950). Later it was decided that the undertaking should take the form of a
code. Two parts of the first chapter, which deals with the validity of treaties, have
already been completed. They concern formal validity and temporal validity. The
part on essential validity has not yet been reported. Distinguished rapporteurs on these
projects have been James L. Brierly, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, and G. G. Fitzmaurice.
See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/101 (1956); U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/107 (1957).
68. See 5 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 158 (1943).
69. Ibid.
70. Id. at 159.
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If a treaty is complete and regular on its face, national constitutional
limitations will not be recognized in international law as grounds for
terminating the treaty."1 In 1931, Secretary of State Stimson implied
that the United States recognizes this principle. In answer to a letter
from Nicaraguan President Moncada, in which the latter expressed
doubt as to the constitutionality of the Byron-Chamarno Nicagraguan
canal treaty in light of provisions in the Nicaraguan Constitution that
the state could give up no independence, Mr. Stimson said that he was
confident that Nicaragua would take any steps ". . . necessary on its
part to insure the proper realization of the objectives of the treaty. '17 2
As to the subject-matter of treaties, the only requirements seem to
be that it create rights and obligations or establish relationships governed
by international law, and have a legal object. If an agreement is entered
into without rights and obligations, it is not an act in international law
and of no significance in the law of treaties. 4 Likewise, it has been sug-
gested that if a treaty has an unlawful object, such as disposing of the
rights of non-signatory nations without notice or consultation, the agree-
ment is invalid.7 ' Thus, if a treaty were entered into by the United
States solely to achieve domestic legislation or to favor the federal gov-
ernment over the state governments, it would be invalid by principles of
international law. Potter equates "fraud" with "bad faith," and would
label this a fraud upon the treaty-making power."8
Of course, if international law is to control the essential validity of
treaties, there must be proper machinery to provide effective enforce-
ment. There are several possibilities. In the first place, national courts
could apply these international law principles in testing essential validity.
Customary international law has been regarded as a part of the common
law in the United States and is directly applicable by both federal and
state courts.7 However, there is an immediate practical problem in that
national judges are sworn to uphold the national constitutions and stat-
utes. Thus they would not always be free to apply international law
71. See 5 HACKWORTHr, INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (1943). Part III of the proposed
Code on the Law of Treaties also provides that the fact that the treaty has proved in-
consistent with the constitution or municipal laws of the state shall not be recognized as
grounds for termination of the treaty. U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/107 (1957).
72. See 5 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 155 (1943).
73. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/101 (1956) (definition of a treaty).
74. U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/23 (1950) (comment by Brierly on the definition of
treaty in, the Draft Convention).
75. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/Ser.A (1950) (statement by commission member
Jesus Maria Yepes).
76. Potter, Inhibitions Upon the Treaty-Making Power of the United States, 28
Am. J. INT'L L. 456, 472 (1934).
77. See The Paquete Habana, 175 US.. 677 (1900); Wright, Treaties as Law in
Natioial Courts with Especial Reference to the United States, 32 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (1956).
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principles, especially if the terms of the treaty violated provisions in the
national constitution."8 Secondly, an expanded world court system could
be established with exclusive jurisdiction over the essential validity of
treaties. National courts could then be required to grant full faith and
credit to its decrees."0 Thirdly, the United Nations could control the
essential validity of treaties by a registration system. This course has
been advocated in the International Law Commission.8" A fourth alter-
native would be an original determination of essential validity in national
courts, with a subsequent right to a hearing in the International Court
of Justice. The decision of the latter court should be recognized as uni-
versally binding.81  However, since only states may be parties before the
International Court of justice,82 there may be a practical difficulty in
that the losing party in the national court may be a private person or one
of the United States.
Several of these alternatives will become practical only after a
greater expansion in world cooperation. However, a start in the right
direction would be made if courts abandoned the "domestic concern-
proper subject of international concern" dichotomy and applied inter-
national law standards to test the essential validity of treaties. If es-
sential validity is not a political question in national courts, at least it
should not be tested by independent national standards. It may be that
United States judges could not enforce a treaty which contravened ex-
press provisions of the Constitution, but even this has not gone un-
78. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). ". . . no agreement with a foreign
nation can confer power on the Congress, or any other branch of Government, which
is free from the restraints of the Constitution." Id. at 16.
79. Charles S. Rhyne, past president of the American Bar Association, has advo-
cated such an expanded world court system. Rhyne, World Peace Through Law: The
President's Annual Address, 44 A.B.A.J. 937, 997 (1958).
80. Mr. Jesus Maria Yepes intended to propose the following Article for inclusion
in the Coarvention on the Law of Treaties:
In order to be valid, a treaty, as understood in this Convention, must have
a lawful purpose according to international law. In case of any dispute re-
garding the lawfulness of a treaty, the International Court of Justice shall state
its opinion on the matter at the request of any State direcly or indirectly in-
terested, or of the United Nations.
A treaty with an unlawful object may not be registered with the Secre-
tariat of the United Nations. Whenever the lawfulness of a treaty submitted
for registration is in doubt, the Secretary General of the United Nations shall
ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. U.N. Doc.
No. A/CN.4/Ser.A (1950).
81. The same may be true in matters of interpretation of a treaty. Principles of
international law could be applied, and the final authority could be the International
Court of Justice. A party should not judge his own case. See Wright, Amendments
and Reservations to the Treaty, 4 MiNx. L. Rhv. 17, 29 (1919).
82. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 34, para. 1.
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challenged. 3 It is sufficient to note that if political expediency and pub-
lic opinion concur that such a treaty is desirable, the Constitution could
be amended to permit the agreement to be enforced.8"
Since the problem in the Niagara River Power case arose from a
reservation to a treaty inserted by the Senate, it is necessary briefly to
discuss this aspect of the treaty-making power. By definition a reserva-
tion is a formal statement made by a prospective party to create a dif-
ferent relationship between it and the other prospective party.8" If made
by the Senate and approved by the President, its effect is a new offer
which must then be approved by the other party or parties. A mere
interpretive statement is not a reservation,8" nor can one be valid which
is not stated in the original treaty proclaimed by the President.8 But if
the reservation is annexed to the treaty and subsequently ratified by the
other party with the reservation attached, it is a part of the treaty and
as binding as if it were in the body of the instrument.88
Since reservations are a part of the treaty as ratified by the Senate
and proclaimed by the President, they should not be taken out of context
and examined in isolation. It is sufficient if the treaty as a whole cre-
ates rights and obligations; each separate provision need not do so. Nor
should the fact that a particular provision came into the treaty by reser-
vation, rather than having been inserted by the executive in the first
instance, be a relevant consideration.
Of course a rider may be attached to a treaty which has nothing to
do with its valid purpose or subject matter. For example, the Senate
could attach a provision that henceforth all matters of municipal zoning
would be decided by Congress, or that the Taft-Hartley act is hereby re-
pealed, to a treaty concerning fisheries in international waters. The other
signatory party probably would not object and the treaty would be pro-
claimed with these "reservations." In this case, the so-called reservations
obviously would be unconnected with the subject-matter of the treaty
itself and not intended to create rights and obligations or to establish
relationships between the parties. Thus, they would be invalid by prin-
ciples of international law. 9 Since these provisions would be severable
83. Potter, Inhibitions Upon the Treaty-Making Power of the United States, 28
Am. J. INT'L L. 456, 473 (1934).
84. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957).
85. 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 519 (2d ed. 1947); 5 HACKWORTH, INTERNA-
TIoNAL LAW 479 (1943).
86. See Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901).
87. See New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1 (1897).
88. See Doe ex. dei. Clark v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 656 (1853).
89. There is an apparent similarity between these illustrations and the reservation
in the Niagara River Power case. In fact the majority in that case noted that that reser-
vation did not change the relationship between the parties and was not intended to create
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from the remainder of the treaty, the residue should be valid.
Viewed in this light, the dictum in Power Authority of New York v.
Federal Power Commission9" seems unfortunate. Although it may be
politically inexpedient to enter treaties about a variety of subjects that
historically have been considered of purely domestic concern, there is no
judicially enforceable constitutional limitation to prevent it. What is a
proper subject for international concern depends upon the development of
international law and cooperation, and courts should not erect a standard
to test the essential validity of treaties upon this term or its converse,
domestic concern. The courts' function in reviewing essential validity,
if any, should be limited to the narrow area where it is contended that the
treaty is unlawful according to principles of international law. The
treaty-making power is a political one and in the main should be left to
the wisdom and discretion of those who are charged with its operation,
and who are responsible to the people for their conduct.
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS FROM THE USE OF CONSIGN-
MENT CONTRACTS IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
Consignment is generally used as a device to protect a vendor from
either the fraudulent bulk sales or insolvency of his vendee. Protection
is afforded the vendor by his retention of title enabling him to set aside
sales not made in the ordinary course of business and giving him sole
claim to the goods in the event of the vendee's financial failure. Gen-
erally, the consignee retains the power to set the prices and is regarded
as the bailee of the vendor for the sale of the goods. However, the
vendor may exercise such control over the prices and business of the
consignee that the consignee becomes the vendor's agent. When such
control over the consignee's prices is exercised in conjunction with a
genuine agency system of distribution, a consignment-agency plan exists,
which has been held not to constitute a violation of the antitrust laws.1 The
use of consignment raises problems which may include not only a deter-
mination as to the existence of a genuine agency but also the applicability
rights or obligations. Power Authority of New York v. Federal Power Commission,
247 F.2d 538, 541 (1957). The distinction to be noted is that the reservation in the
Niagara River Power case was directly germane to the subject-matter of the treaty and
an outgrowth of international negotiation. Id. at 549 (dissent). The illustrations, on
the other hand, are remote from the negotiations and the subject-matter of the treaty.
90. 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir), wacated as moot, 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
1. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
